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We document and assess the role of small financial centers in the international financial 
system using a newly-assembled dataset. We present estimates of the foreign asset and 
liability positions for a number of the most important small financial centers, and place these 
into context by calculating the importance of these locations in the global aggregate of cross-
border investment positions. We also report data on bilateral cross-border investment 
patterns, highlighting which countries engage in financial trade with small financial centers.  
 
 
Keywords: Financial centers, international investment position, capital flows. 
 








* We are grateful to Stijn Claessens, Salim Darbar, John Joisce, Jean Galand, and Olaf 
Unteroberdoerster for useful comments and discussions, to Katharina Ferl, John Kowalski, Peter 
McQuade, and Christiane Hellmanzik for excellent research assistance, to Linda Goldberg for helpful 
references and to Kalin Tintchev for his help with the Information Framework database. Email: 
plane@tcd.ie, gmilesiferretti@imf.org .   2  
 
 
I.   I TRODUCTIO  
Our goal in this note is to document and assess the role of small international financial 
centers in the global financial system, using a newly-assembled dataset. These centers play 
an important role as financial intermediaries for cross-border capital flows. For example, 
statistics of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) indicate that banks resident in the 
Cayman Islands held over $1.7 trillion in assets at the end of 2008 (more than Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain combined), while the U.S. survey of portfolio liabilities for June 2008 finds that 
Caribbean financial centers were holding over $1 trillion in U.S. long-term securities.  
 
However, full coverage of the cross-border financial intermediation role of small financial 
centers is elusive, since most of these countries do not report their international investment 
positions. In this paper, we build on the methods developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001, 2007) in order to provide rough estimates of the foreign asset and liability positions of 
a number of the most important offshore financial centers.
1 Next, we place these into context 
by calculating the importance of these locations in the global aggregate of cross-border 
investment positions. Finally, we report some information on bilateral cross-border 
investment patterns, highlighting which countries engage in financial trade with this group of 
offshore financial centers. A data appendix provides a detailed description of the data sources 
and methods employed in our calculations.  
 
Why is this work of interest? While small financial centers are in most cases “pure 
intermediaries” and not an ultimate source or final destination for cross-border investment, 
their financial interconnections with advanced economies in particular are very significant—
as our data will show, a non-trivial fraction of global capital flows pass through entities 
resident in these countries en route to ultimate investment destinations. 
2 A better 
understanding of the role of these centers in international financial flows can also help shed 
light on true underlying exposures for countries’ external claims and liabilities. Two 
examples help underscore this point: 
 
  Felettigh and Monti (2008) document that while a substantial fraction of Italian portfolio 
asset holdings are reported as equity claims on Ireland and Luxembourg in the form of 
                                                 
1 In 2004, the Fund initiated a data collection exercise with offshore financial centers to promote and 
disseminate data on the size and scope of their financial activity 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/050808a.pdf). In this note, we rely on these data as well as other 
sources.  
2 International statistics on the balance of payments and on cross-border financial claims and liabilities are 
based on the residence principle.    3  
 
mutual fund shares, their ultimate destination tends to be outside the euro area and the 
underlying instruments skewed towards debt rather than equity. 
 
  According to the June 2007 and June 2008 surveys of U.S. portfolio liabilities, the 
Cayman Islands were the largest foreign holder of private-label U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities. More information on the ultimate holders of these securities could clearly 
provide valuable insights on the transmission of the “sub-prime shock” and the financial 
crisis more generally. 
 
Before delving into the details of the data, it is important to highlight that our data sources 
are not only incomplete but often indirect (namely, claims and liabilities vis-à-vis these 
centers reported by other countries). Consequently, the estimates we provide can best be seen 
as providing a broad order of magnitude of the financial intermediation role of these 
countries rather than a precise assessment. In light of these factors, the guiding principle of 
our data construction work is the assumption that net external positions of these countries are 
negligible in absolute terms, even though they may be non-trivial in relation to the (small) 
GDP levels of these centers. Therefore the maximum between the estimated external assets 
and the estimated external liabilities is likely to provide the most reliable estimate of the 
scale of their cross-border holdings.  
 
The academic literature on small financial centers is relatively small. Rose and Spiegel 
(2007) focus on the causes and consequences of offshore financial centers, and argue that 
these centers may increase activities such as tax evasion in neighboring countries, but also 
find that proximity to these centers leads to more competitive banking systems. Masciandaro 
(2006) also examines the driving forces that determine which countries become financial 
centers. There is also a closely-related literature that analyses the determinants of tax haven 
status and the role played by tax havens in the global economy (see Dharmapala, 2008 and 
Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). None of these papers, however, provides a quantitative 
assessment of the role of small financial centers in international capital markets.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of 
financial activities in small international financial centers. Section III provides a brief 
description of the data construction process (with the Appendix elaborating on these issues in 
more detail). Section IV presents the aggregate data; Section V the available evidence on the 
geographical breakdown of these centers’ external claims and liabilities; and Section VI 
sketches the initial impact of the financial crisis on the external balance sheets of these 
centers. 
 
II.   I TER ATIO AL FI A CIAL ACTIVITIES OF SMALL FI A CIAL CE TERS 
Taken together, the group of small financial centers is important across several lines of 
production of financial services. These include international banking, insurance, collective    4  
 
investment schemes, asset management, trusts and structured finance (Table 1), with the mix 
of activities varying across the individual countries in line with scale and the level of 
specialization (see discussion below). In general, the small financial centers perform niche 
tasks that correspond to the production of intermediate financial services. In some cases, 
these are produced on an intra-firm basis by the local affiliates of global financial firms; in 
others, there is arm’s length trade between international customers and local specialists. In 
addition to the oft-discussed tax advantages, small financial centers have several other 
sources of comparative advantage. These may include a legal system that is favorable to the 
incorporation of financial-sector entities, the existence of highly-specialized skilled workers 
in key areas and an accommodative regulatory environment.  
 
International banking  Many banks have also used small financial centers for “off balance 
sheet” activities. For instance, onshore banks established conduits and structured investment 
vehicles in offshore centers during the 2003-2007 securitization boom. These vehicles were 
typically funded in onshore financial markets and purchased onshore assets. In addition, as 
explained by Cantillon and Franske (2009), many US banks sweep client funds on an 
overnight basis into offshore affiliates in order maximize short-term investment returns, with 
offshore instruments accounting for 32 percent of total sweep assets.
3  
 
Insurance  Bermuda has emerged as a dominant location for captive insurance, whereby 
onshore firms establish Bermuda affiliates that offer insurance for group-wide activities. The 
legal, regulatory and tax systems in Bermuda have been designed to allow these captive 
insurance firms to operate in an efficient manner. Many other small financial centers also 
play a role in the insurance sector. 
 
Collective Investment Schemes  The Cayman Islands is a key chain in the industrial 
organization of the hedge fund industry. It is the home to many feeder funds that gather 
contributions from clients, which in turn are typically managed by onshore master funds. In 
addition, leveraged feeder funds may borrow from offshore and onshore banks. 
 
Structured Finance  Small financial centers are also often used in the structured finance 
sector. Special purpose vehicles and structured investment vehicles may be established in an 
offshore center to hold a specific asset or bundle of assets. In principle, such entities ring-
fence financial risks and may not appear on the balance sheet of the sponsoring financial 
institution or corporation. For instance, the United States Government Accountability Office 
(2008) explains the role of the Cayman Islands in the aircraft leasing sector and in SIVs that 
held bundles of asset-backed securities. In turn, these entities may be funded via onshore debt 
markets and bank loans. 
 
                                                 
3 See also the exposition on sweep accounts in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009).    5  
 
Headquarter Services  It may be attractive to certain types of firms to incorporate in an 
offshore financial center in order to benefit from legal and tax advantages. According to the 
United States Government Accountability Office (2008), some 732 companies traded on U.S. 
stock exchanges reported to SEC that they are incorporated in the Cayman Islands. This 
could explain some of the portfolio equity holdings in "common stock" by US residents in 
the Cayman Islands ($158bn). 
Foreign direct investment  Small financial centers also play an important role in the internal 
organization of multinational firms. For instance, the financial management and treasury 
operations of multinational firms typically includes the establishment of offshore affiliates 
and special purpose vehicles that can be helpful in executing specific transactions, such as a 
new acquisition or merger. In some cases, firms have opted to locate the head office in an 
offshore center with the onshore activities organized into affiliates of the offshore 
headquarters.  
 
Through these activities, the group of small financial centers are significant counterparts in 
the international investment positions of many countries. These include cross-border assets 
and liabilities in a range of categories: portfolio equity, portfolio debt, other debt and FDI. In 
relation to portfolio equity, claims on small financial centers may either take the form of 
shares in corporations that are headquartered in these countries or shares in collective 
investment schemes (mutual funds, hedge funds) that are domiciled in these countries. For 
portfolio debt, entities resident in small financial centers are significant purchasers and 
issuers of international portfolio debt instruments. For instance, a structured investment 
vehicle in a small financial center may be funded through the issuance of commercial paper, 
while holding a range of portfolio debt assets.  
 
The small financial centers are also important in relation to non-portfolio components of the 
international balance sheet. Banks in these countries are highly active in making loans and 
receiving deposits, with a significant proportion of this banking activity comprising inter-
office transactions between affiliates of the major international banks. In relation to FDI, the 
small financial centers are home to many affiliates of global banks and corporations and 
intra-firm debt and equity positions are non-trivial. In addition, some major global 
corporations are headquartered in these countries with the parent entity in turn having 
significant financial links to its affiliates in the major advanced economies and elsewhere. 
 
Moreover, the intermediation role played by offshore financial centers means that it is 
typically challenging to establish the ultimate destination of investments that are routed 
through these centers. This matters for financial stability analysis, since the pattern of 
ultimate risk exposures is required to establish the risks embedded in the international 
balance sheet. The two examples cited in the introduction (the holdings of U.S. mortgage-
backed securities in the Cayman Islands and Italian portfolio holdings in Ireland and 
Luxembourg) vividly illustrate this point. More generally, the assets that are routed through    6  
 
small financial centers may be ultimately directed to some other foreign destination or, in 
some key cases, re-invested in the domestic financial system. The round tripping 
phenomenon is prevalent among the advanced economies, where financially-sophisticated 
entities seek to maximize the gains from regulatory arbitrage. In relation to emerging 
markets, the existence of capital controls and rules that differentiate between foreign and 
domestic investors can also induce significant round-tripping activity. For instance, Hong 
Kong plays a significant role in FDI and portfolio round-tripping for China, while Mauritius 
fulfills a similar function for India. 
 
III.   DATA CO STRUCTIO  
We consider a group of thirty-two small international financial centers, which we will label 
the SIFC group.
 We omit from this list several important international financial centers such 
as Cyprus, Hong Kong S.A.R. of China, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Singapore, for which we 
already report estimates of external assets and liabilities in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
These countries are typically significantly larger than the countries included in the SIFC 
group.  
 
Our main sources of data are the locational banking statistics published by the BIS, the IMF 
data initiative for offshore centers (Information Framework), the IMF-sponsored Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Balance 
of Payments Statistics databases, UNCTAD data on foreign direct investment, as well as a 
variety of national data sources for the main advanced economies that provide a geographical 
breakdown of these countries’ external assets and/or liabilities. In what follows we provide a 
brief sketch of how the country data are constructed, referring the reader to the Appendix for 
a more detailed description.  
 
Portfolio investment is one of the categories for which measurement problems are 
particularly severe. One reason is that several of the financial centers included in our sample 
have significant financial activity undertaken by collective investment schemes (such as 
mutual funds or hedge funds) and, in some cases, structured finance vehicles, but available 
data on the size of these activities is still rather scant. And when data on collective 
investment schemes are available (as is the case, for example, for the Cayman Islands for 
2006 and 2007), these data are sometimes hard to reconcile with data on bilateral holdings 
reported by partner countries.
4 For our data construction we rely primarily on the CPIS as 
well as on BIS statistics on security issuance. For around 70 participating economies, the 
                                                 
4 For example, the Net Asset Value reported by hedge funds registered in the Cayman Islands totaled over $2.2 
trillion at end-2007. However, portfolio equity claims on the Cayman Islands reported by the main investor 
countries participating in the CPIS were only $768bn. See the discussion in Section IV below. The Cayman 
Islands participate as a reporter to the CPIS, but only report portfolio holdings held by banks, excluding the very 
large collective investment schemes industry.    7  
 
CPIS provides the level and geographical breakdown of portfolio investment holdings. A few 
of the countries in our sample (for example Bermuda) participate in the CPIS, and this allows 
us to use these data. For non-participating countries, we can use CPIS data to infer the level 
of portfolio liabilities of small financial centers, by adding up the claims on these centers that 
CPIS-participating countries report. BIS securities statistics report the total amount of 
international debt securities issued in various jurisdictions, including small financial centers. 
If we assume, as is reasonable, that these securities are held by nonresidents, these statistics 
provide the stock of portfolio debt liabilities of the various small financial centers. 
 
For the other investment category, we make use of locational banking statistics from the BIS. 
For small financial centers that report their banking statistics to the BIS, we can make use of 
these figures directly. In addition, we can use BIS locational statistics from an “immediate 
borrower” perspective to infer the claims and liabilities that residents of these centers hold 
vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks.  
 
For foreign direct investment, we make use of the statistics compiled by UNCTAD as well as 
of the geographical breakdown of FDI statistics provided by some advanced economies, such 
as the United States.  
 
Data on reserve assets for these centers (which are typically modest in absolute terms) can be 
obtained in some cases from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Finally, data on 
financial derivatives are at the moment very difficult to track, as is the case for most other 
advanced economies as well.  
 
IV.   COU TRY CHARACTERISTICS A D EXTER AL BALA CE SHEET OF THE SIFC GROUP 
As of 2007, the total population of the SIFC group was just over 12.7 million and average 
GDP per capita was around US$11,600 (Table 2). These countries therefore represent a tiny 
fraction of world population and world GDP. Table 2 shows that there is significant 
heterogeneity within the group, in terms of population size and output per capita. While the 
median population is 88,000, the range is large, with Montserrat the smallest at 6,000 people 
and Lebanon the largest at 4.1 million. In relation to GDP per capita, the median value is 
around $18,000, while the range spans the $2,200 level of Nauru to the $118,000 level of 
Liechtenstein.  
 
While a majority of SIFCs are independent countries (Table 3), a number of those with high 
external assets and liabilities (such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman 
islands, and the Channel Islands) are British territories or Crown dependencies. They either 
have fixed exchange rates or directly use a major currency (Table 4).  
 
Given the measurement difficulties discussed earlier, it is not feasible to compile a 
comprehensive time series for external assets and liabilities of these centers for all asset    8  
 
categories. In our data presentation, we therefore focus primarily on SIFC’s external assets 
and liabilities as of end-2007, but also report some time-series information concerning SIFC 
positions vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks as well as their portfolio liabilities as derived from 
the IMF CPIS survey.  
 
We estimate the size of their gross international balance sheet (the sum of their external 
assets and liabilities) to be over US$18 trillion—most likely an underestimate, in light of the 
severe data problems highlighted in the previous section. This estimate implies that SIFCs 
account for about 8 ½ percent of world cross-border holdings (Figure 1). SIFC external assets 
and liabilities are hence quite substantial. For example, they exceed those of major investing 
nations such as France, Germany, or Japan (Figure 2) and are a multiple of those of other 
large economies such as China (around $4 trillion).  
 
Table 5 and Figure 3 provide a country-by-country breakdown of the estimated size of 
SIFCs’ external balance sheets. The external balance sheet is not calculated by summing 
estimated external assets and liabilities, but by assuming that the net external position is zero 
and that either external assets or external liabilities are thus underestimated. In light of the 
severe limitations in data coverage, this is a reasonable assumption, all the more so if the 
objective is to provide broad orders of magnitude for the role of these countries in 
international financial intermediation. 
5 
  
Overall, a small group of SIFC countries account for the vast bulk of the holdings, with 
external assets and liabilities that are very high (above $100bn) in absolute terms. These 
include the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the U.K Channel Islands (Guernsey, 
Jersey, and the Isle of Man), the British Virgin Islands, and the Netherlands Antilles. Among 
these, the very large size of the Cayman Islands’ international balance sheet, which accounts 
for approximately half the aggregate international balance sheet of the SIFC group, is 
particularly striking. The Cayman Islands are especially important in terms of portfolio 
liabilities and banking assets and liabilities.  
 
While these figures are large, they are very likely under-estimates. For example, a survey of 
hedge funds incorporated in the Cayman Islands conducted by the Cayman Islands Monetary 
Authority found that their net asset value was over US$2.2 trillion at end-2007. 
6 To the 
extent that the hedge fund shares are held by nonresidents, these would be portfolio equity 
liabilities of the Cayman Islands. The survey includes both feeder funds and funds of funds, 
                                                 
5 The assumption of a zero external position is less appropriate for the “larger” SIFCs, such as Bahrain (a net 
creditor) and Lebanon and Panama (net debtors). However, reasonable estimates of the net external position for 
these countries are small in absolute terms (less than $40bn) and hence have negligible implications on the total 
figures reported in Table 5. 
6 See Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (2009).    9  
 
in addition to master funds, and therefore some double-counting is likely. This 
notwithstanding, the total is almost 3 times the portfolio assets reported to be held in the 
Cayman Islands by countries participating in the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey, which form the base of the calculation of the Cayman Islands’ portfolio equity 
liabilities included in Table 5.  
 
We compare the importance of the SIFC group to other prominent international financial 
centers in Figure 3. The Figure shows the distribution of cross-border positions among all 
countries where the sum of external assets and liabilities is at least 8 times GDP. This group 
(which includes some larger countries such as the United Kingdom) accounts for some 10 
percent of global GDP, less than 1 percent of world population, but over 40 percent of global 
cross-border investment positions. Within this group, SIFCs account for over 20 percent of 
total external assets and liabilities.  
 
Figure 4 shows the composition of the international balance sheet for the SIFC group. The 
“other investment” component, which includes primarily bank assets and liabilities, accounts 
for more than half of the total external claims and liabilities of these countries, while the 
portfolio (debt and equity) component has a 36 percent share. While the share of FDI is 
relatively small, it is strikingly important for some countries. For example, Figure 5 depicts 
the geographical origin and destination of Hong Kong’s foreign direct investment. At end-
2007, investment to and from the British Virgin Islands was of the same order of magnitude 
as investment to and from Mainland China.  
 
The importance of the SIFC group over time as a destination of global cross-border portfolio 
investment is highlighted in Figure 6A. Based on CPIS data (available since 2001), this 
figure shows the time-varying share of global portfolio equity and debt assets invested in 
SIFCs over 2001-2007. The portfolio equity share has climbed from just under 6 percent to 
nearly 9 percent over this time period, whereas the portfolio debt share has remained 
relatively stable in the 5-6 percent range. As discussed earlier, the portfolio equity category 
includes shares in collective investment schemes, such that the ‘ultimate claims’ represented 
by these equity assets may be debt or equity assets that most likely are located in other 
destinations. 
 
Figure 6B shows the importance of the SIFC group in cross-border banking activity, by 
depicting the claims and liabilities of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis SIFCs, as a share of their 
total claims. Since the end of 2001, when claims and liabilities vis-à-vis the U.K. Channel 
Islands start to be reported separately from U.K. data, both shares have remained broadly  
stable (13-14 percent for SIFC assets, and 9-10 percent for SIFC liabilities). In dollar terms, 
however, these holdings have tripled between end-2001 and end-2007. Claims of BIS-
reporting banks on SIFCs are of the same order of magnitude as their claims on emerging 
markets as a whole. 
    10  
 
V.   BILATERAL PATTER S 
In this section we focus on available information on the financial trading partners of SIFCs. 
The data we present, taken from Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa (2009), rely on 
published sources.
7 Overall, these bilateral holdings account for around 90 percent of total 
estimated external assets and liabilities of SIFCs—a high figure, particularly taking into 
account that a full bilateral breakdown for external claims and liabilities of the main 
advanced economies is not available.  
 
The lion share of bilateral claims and liabilities of SIFCs are vis-à-vis the major world 
financial trading partners—the United States, the euro area, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and Japan, as well as Hong Kong (Figure 8a). For example, for the United 
States identified cross-border assets and liabilities vis-à-vis SIFCs at end-2007 were over 
US$6 trillion, some 16 percent of the total U.S. portfolio (Table 6). For the euro area and the 
United Kingdom, SIFCs account instead for just under 10 percent of cross-border holdings. 
For Hong Kong instead the ratio is much higher, even though bilateral bank holdings vis-à-
vis SIFCs (except for Macao S.A.R.) are not included because of lack of data. Evidence 
reported in IMF (2008), based on BIS locational banking statistics, suggests a “geographical” 
bias in cross-border holdings vis-à-vis SIFCs, with Caribbean centers having closer financial 
ties with the United States and other financial centers in Europe with the euro area and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 8b shows the composition of bilateral SIFC cross-border holdings by financial 
instrument, highlighting the importance of both portfolio and other investment instruments 
(which mostly comprise bank loans and deposits). The bilateral data also underscore some of 
the problems in estimating the cross-border position of SIFCs. For example, estimated 
bilateral FDI assets and liabilities of SIFCs greatly exceed the estimated total (compare the 
dark line with the various columns in Figure 8b). This is due primarily to significant bilateral 
FDI holdings reported by the euro area vis-à-vis ‘offshore centers,’ for which no further 




                                                 
7 Therefore the data exclude unpublished bilateral locational banking statistics (published in aggregate form by 
the BIS), but includes bilateral banking data published by the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and 
Japan, as well as data on “other investment” assets and liabilities vis-à-vis “offshore centers” published by the 
euro area. Note that holdings by one SIFC in another are excluded from the bilateral holdings calculations. 
8 The definition of ‘offshore centers’ in euro area statistics is very close to our SIFC definition, but also includes 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Estimated assets and liabilities of the euro area vis-à-vis these two economies were 
therefore netted out from the totals depicted in Chart 8.    11  
 
VI.   THE EFFECTS OF THE FI A CIAL CRISIS: A PRELIMI ARY LOOK 
The financial crisis affected large international banking institutions particularly heavily—and 
those institutions make heavy use of financial intermediation through small financial centers. 
While there is still a lot of uncertainty on what the medium-term implications of the financial 
crisis and its policy response for financial intermediation in small financial centers, 
preliminary data on these centers’ external holdings at the end of 2008 allows us to take a 
first look as to whether they have been affected more severely than holdings in other 
economies.  
 
As shown in Table 8, total external assets and liabilities declined by more in SIFCs than in 
the world economy as a whole, with their world share falling below 8 percent. The Table also 
shows that this pattern is present in financial centers more generally. While the absolute 
decline in the value of cross-border positions reflects the end-2008 collapse in equity prices 
across the globe, the relative decline in the size of positions in financial centers is linked in 
particular to the sharp retrenchment in cross-border banking positions during 2008, 
particularly over the 4
th quarter. These positions are particularly large in financial centers. 
Still, SIFCs also saw some decline in their share of outstanding portfolio liabilities as 
inferred from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (Figure 7a).  
 
 
VII.   CO CLUDI G REMARKS 
The role of small international financial centers in cross-border capital flows has been 
intensely discussed in policy circles, particularly since the global financial crisis. In this note 
we have provided a quantitative sense of the importance of these centers in international 
financial flows, using a novel dataset. While data shortcomings are daunting and coverage 
significantly incomplete, we show that external assets and liabilities of entities resident in 
these centers are substantial—particularly in cross-border banking activity and in portfolio 
investment. We also document the significant bilateral financial linkages between these small 
centers and the main advanced economies, including larger financial centers.  
 
Small international financial centers are intermediaries, and therefore ultimate exposures for 
their financial trading partners typically lie elsewhere (indeed, the consolidated banking data 
published by the Bank for International Settlements show smaller exposures for these centers 
on an ultimate risk basis). But in light of these centers’ quantitative importance, particularly 
in certain segments of international financial market activity, and in light of the fact that most 
available data on cross-border financial activity is on a residence basis, the analysis of cross-
border financial linkages would be significantly enhanced if aggregate and bilateral data on 
cross-border asset trade involving financial centers became more readily available.   
 
Appendix 1. List of countries and territories 
 
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Macao SAR of China, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands 
Antilles, Palau, Panama, Samoa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu, British Virgin Islands. 
 
Appendix II. Data Sources for IIP estimates 
 
This appendix discusses how to put together estimates for the various external asset and 
liability categories for the most relevant “small” international financial centers (SIFCs). The 
most obvious data source—a full-fledged IIP (international investment position) is typically 
not available for these centers, with only a couple of exceptions. Consequently, estimates 
must be pieced together from a variety of alternative sources.  
 
SIFCs in some cases intermediate a very significant amount of funds in absolute terms. At 
the same time, they are “pure” intermediaries—their net external position is extremely small 
in absolute terms (even if not necessarily as a share of their GDP). The considerable extent of 
imprecision in estimates of external assets and liabilities can however imply implausibly 
large net creditor or debtor positions. Consequently, these estimates are simply meant to 
provide a broad order of magnitude for the size of intermediated funds. In light of the 
incomplete coverage of financial institutions and investment vehicles, the maximum between 
estimated external assets and liabilities is likely to provide a more accurate—albeit 
imperfect—measure of total intermediated funds.  
 
I.   EXTER AL ASSETS 
A.   Portfolio investment assets (equity and debt) 
  CPIS asset survey (when available). However, coverage of the survey may be limited 
to certain sectors (for example, banking—but not mutual or hedge funds—for the 
Cayman Islands).  
 
  Surveys of portfolio liabilities by country of holder. These surveys are available for the 
United States (as of June 30, rather than end of year) and from some CPIS-participating 
countries (such as Japan).  
 
  BIS -- Bank assets other than loans reported to the BIS (for SIFCs whose banks report 
their assets to BIS). The non-loan assets comprise mainly portfolio holdings but could 
also include direct investment holdings or derivatives.  
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  BIS -- For SIFCs whose banks do not report assets to the BIS, an alternative source are 
BIS-reporting banks’ non-deposit liabilities towards individual SIFCs. 
 
  National data on total asset value of collective investment schemes. A (possibly 
significant) fraction of the total asset value (TAV) of collective investment schemes is 
likely held in portfolio instruments.  
 
B.   Direct investment abroad 
  UNCTAD. For several SIFCs, the UNCTAD database report total foreign direct 
investment stocks and flows.  
 
  Alternatively, FDI abroad can be estimated from other countries’ FDI liability surveys 
(which include bilateral positions) reported by Eurostat, the OECD, UNCTAD, and 
individual countries such as the United States, which is particularly important for 
Caribbean SIFCs. 
 
C.   Other investment assets 
  BIS -- Loans reported by SIFC banks (for BIS reporters). 
 
  BIS – Liabilities of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis individual SIFCs. In particular, data 
on BIS-reporting banks’ liabilities to nonbank entities in SIFCs can be used to 
complement the data on bank loans reported by the SIFC (which should in principle 
exceed the liabilities of BIS-reporting banks to the SIFC banks).  
 
  IFS – foreign assets held by banks and nonbank financial institutions (including 
monetary authorities non-reserve assets).  
 
D.   Financial derivatives 
These could theoretically be estimated from reported bilateral derivatives positions of other 
countries (such as the United States). In practice, very few countries report a counterparty 
breakdown for derivatives, and even in those cases the counterparty breakdown may not be 
detailed enough to identify individual SIFC counterparties. One exception are the Cayman 
Islands, which are reported separately in U.S. bilateral data on derivatives. 
 
E.   Reserve assets 
When relevant. Sources: 
 
  IFS (when available) 
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  WEO 
 
II.   EXTER AL LIABILITIES 
A.   Portfolio investment liabilities 
Equity 
  CPIS – derived liabilities (from bilateral asset positions reported by participating 
countries). In these countries equity will include shares of mutual fund and hedge fund 
investments (as well as, on occasion, shares of US companies headquartered in the 
center—insurance companies in Bermuda etc). 
 
  National data on Net Asset Value (NAV) of collective investment vehicles (CIV). To 
the extent that shares in CIVs are held by nonresidents (which is likely to be the case, 
although some double-counting is possible in the case of feeder funds or funds of 
funds) the NAV of CIVs would be portfolio liabilities of the reporting economy. 
 
Debt 
  BIS – international debt securities outstanding by residence of issuer. This should be a 
good proxy for external debt liabilities since holders of these securities would 
overwhelmingly be nonresidents. 
 




B.   Direct Investment Liabilities 
  UNCTAD. For several SIFCs, the UNCTAD database report total foreign direct 
investment stocks and flows.  
 
  Alternatively, FDI in the SIFC can be estimated from other countries’ surveys of FDI 
abroad (which include bilateral positions) reported by Eurostat, the OECD, UNCTAD, 
and individual countries such as the United States, which is particularly important for 
Caribbean SIFCs. 
 
  Derived liabilities from bilateral asset survey of individual countries (UNCTAD, 
OECD, Eurostat) 
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C.   Other Investment Liabilities 
  BIS – Deposits reported by offshore country banks (for BIS reporters) 
 
  BIS – Assets of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis offshore country entities. In particular, 
data on claims on nonbank offshore country entities could be used to complement the 
bank deposit liabilities reported by the SIFC (which should in principle exceed the 
claims of BIS-reporting banks on the SIFC banks).  
 
  IFS – foreign liabilities held by banks and nonbank financial institutions (including 
monetary authorities non-reserve liabilities).  
 
 
D.   Financial derivatives 
These can be estimated from reported bilateral derivatives positions of other countries (such 
as the United States). In practice, very few countries report a counterparty breakdown for 
derivatives, and even in those cases the counterparty breakdown may not be detailed enough 
to identify individual SIFC counterparties. One exception are the Cayman Islands, which are 
reported separately in U.S. bilateral data on derivatives. 
 
III.   REFERE CE DATA 
A.   BIS 
1. Tables 2 and 3 locational bank statistics (reported assets and liabilities—for reporting 
SIFCs) 
 
2. Tables 6 and 7 locational bank statistics (derived data from BIS-reporting banks—for all 
countries) 
 
3. Table 11 international debt securities (all countries) 
 
B.   CPIS 
1. Tables 8, 8.1, 8,2 (global tables, portfolio assets equity and debt, derived portfolio 
liabilities equity and debt) 
 
2. Reported liability surveys, Table 4 (to calculate sum of reported liabilities by these 
countries to individual SIFCs) http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/topic.asp?table=4 
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C.   IFS 
1. Banks and other financial institutions’ foreign assets and liabilities (lines 7a etc). 
 
D.   Other sources 
1. UNCTAD: FDI stocks and flows.  
 
2. US survey of portfolio liabilities, June 2008 (U.S. Treasury International Capital System 
website) 
 




For Eurostat data on euro area and other advanced economies, see 
http://nui.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=bop_fdi_pos&lang=en 
 
For Japan, see http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/boj_stat/bop/rdip/rdip2007.zip 
 
For the United Kingdom, see 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/web_2007ma4.xls 
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 Table 1. Small financial centers: main international financial activity 
 
   International Banking Insurance Asset Management Mutual funds 
Structured 
Finance 
          
Andorra X  X  X  X     
Anguilla  X    X          
Antigua and Barbuda  X  X          
Aruba  X  X  X       
The Bahamas  X  X  X  X    
Bahrain  X  X   X  X     
Barbados X  X  X  X     
Belize X  X  X  X     
Bermuda   X  X   X  X    
British Virgin Islands   X   X     X    
Cayman Islands  X  X  X  X  X 
Gibraltar X  X  X  X     
Grenada  X  X          
Guernsey  X  X     X    
Isle of Man  X  X     X    
Jersey  X    X  X       
Lebanon  X        X    
Liechtenstein X  X  X  X     
Macao SAR  X  X  X       
Mauritius X  X  X  X     
Monaco  X     X  X    
Netherlands Antilles  X  X  X       
Panama  X  X          
Samoa    X  X          
Seychelles  X  X     X    
St. Kitts and Nevis  X  X  X  X    
St. Lucia  X  X          
St. Vincent & Grenadines  X  X     X    
Turks and Caicos  X  X  X  X    
Vanuatu  X  X             20  
 
Table 2. Basic country characteristics (2007) 
 
  GDP (millions USD) Population GDP per capita (USD)
Andorra 3,245 74,601 43,504
Anguilla 227 12,625 18,007
Antigua and Barbuda  1,155 85,109 13,568
Aruba 2,623 103,889 25,253
Bahamas, The  7,498 331,277 22,633
Bahrain 18,443 752,647 24,504
Barbados 3,409 293,894 11,599
Belize 1,277 287,698 4,438
Bermuda 5,855 64,559 90,698
Cayman Islands  2,701 47,210 57,222
Gibraltar 1,210 28,875 41,898
Grenada 608 105,668 5,753
Guernsey 3,334 61,811 53,931
Isle of Man  3,437 76,774 44,773
Jersey 8,182 90,800 90,107
Lebanon 25,047 4,099,114 6,110
Liechtenstein 4,160 35,242 118,040
Macao, China  19,115 481,122 39,731
Mauritius 6,927 1,261,643 5,490
Monaco 1,311 32,711 40,090
Montserrat 48 5,875 8,149
Nauru 23 10,152 2,217
Netherlands Antilles  3,463 191,572 18,078
Palau 170 20,314 8,376
Panama 19,485 3,343,374 5,828
Samoa 476 187,026 2,544
St. Kitts  512 50,417 10,149
St. Lucia  960 164,923 5,820
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  546 120,398 4,538
Turks and Caicos  758 25,517 29,706
Vanuatu 507 226,179 2,243
Virgin Islands (British)  1,156 22,545 51,273
      
Median 1,967 87,955 18,042
Total 147,869 12,695,561 11,647
  
Sources: IMF; United Nations; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and national sources.  
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Table 3. Political Status of Small International Financial Centers 
 









Andorra  X             
Anguilla     X          
Antigua and Barbuda  X             
Aruba              X* 
The Bahamas  X             
Bahrain  X             
Barbados  X             
Belize  X             
Bermuda     X          
British Virgin Islands     X          
Cayman Islands     X          
Gibraltar     X          
Grenada  X             
Guernsey        X       
Isle of Man             X**       
Jersey        X       
Lebanon  X             
Liechtenstein  X             
Mauritius  X             
Macao SAR                
Monaco  X             
Nauru  X             
Netherlands Antilles              X 
Palau  X             
Panama  X             
Samoa  X             
Seychelles  X             
St. Kitts and Nevis  X             
St. Lucia  X             
St. Vincent and Grenadines  X             
Turks and Caicos     X          








**self governing    22  
 





















Andorra     X                   
Anguilla           X             
Antigua and Barbuda           X             
Aruba           X             
The Bahamas           X             
Bahrain           X             
Barbados           X             
Belize           X             
Bermuda           X             
British Virgin Islands  X                      
Cayman Islands           X             
Gibraltar              X          
Grenada           X             
Guernsey              X          
Isle of Man        X                
Jersey        X                
Lebanon           X             
Liechtenstein                       X* 
Macao SAR                    X    
Mauritius              X          
Monaco     X                   
Netherlands Antilles           X             
Nauru                       X** 
Palau  X                      
Panama  X        X             
Samoa                       X*** 
Seychelles  X                      
St. Kitts and Nevis           X             
St. Lucia           X             
St. Vincent and Grenadines           X             
Turks and Caicos  X                      
Vanuatu                       X*** 
 
* Uses the Swiss franc 
** Uses the Australian dollar 
*** Basket peg 
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Size of balance 
sheet 
Andorra  9,452 2,437 18,904
Anguilla  2,285 1,217 4,571
Antigua and Barbuda  933 2,750 5,499
Aruba  3,623 10,583 21,165
Bahamas, The  470,749 461,237 941,499
Bahrain  291,103 231,947 582,205
Barbados  60,023 21,449 120,045
Belize  8,113 3,254 16,226
Bermuda  730,013 774,544 1,549,088
Cayman Islands  3,132,944 4,202,954 8,405,907
Gibraltar  30,308 30,681 61,362
Grenada  476 1,694 3,389
Guernsey  508,974 297,082 1,017,948
Isle of Man  143,232 77,894 286,464
Jersey  1,012,145 852,245 2,024,290
Lebanon  52,105 69,313 138,626
Liechtenstein  40,400 10,731 80,800
Macao, China  65,237 25,530 130,473
Mauritius  181,897 71,073 363,793
Monaco  29,575 36,170 72,340
Montserrat  151 143 302
Nauru  37 12 74
Netherlands Antilles  214,427 265,863 531,726
Palau  50 161 322
Panama  147,387 130,502 294,775
Samoa  5,180 1,530 10,361
St. Kitts  503 744 1,488
St. Lucia  907 2,745 5,489
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  3,335 2,362 6,670
Turks and Caicos  1,936 763 3,872
Vanuatu  1,091 789 2,182
Virgin Islands (British)  822,914 793,687 1,645,828
      
Total  7,972 8,384 18,347,686
 
Note: Because of the severe limitations in data coverage, the difference between external assets and liabilities 
cannot be interpreted as an estimate of the country’s net external position. The size of the balance sheet is 
estimated assuming that the net external position is equal to zero, so the total reported corresponds to 2 times 
the maximum between estimated external assets and estimated external liabilities.     24  
 
Table 6. Relative importance of external linkages with SIFCs (2007) 
 
  Liabilities vis-à-vis SIFCs  Assets vis-à-vis SIFCs 
  (in percent of total country liabilities)  (in percent of total country assets) 
    
United States  16.9%  15.4% 
Euro Area  7.9%  9.8% 
United Kingdom  9.0%  7.2% 
Japan 3.9%  9.3% 
Switzerland 16.3%  15.1% 
Hong Kong  23.3%  28.0% 
  
Note: each entry reports the liabilities (assets) of the country vis-à-vis SIFCs, as a ratio of the country’s total 
external liabilities (assets). A bilateral data breakdown is not available for all external assets and liabilities of 




Table 7. Sum of external assets and liabilities of financial centers, 2007-2008 
 
 2007  2008 
    
    
Small international financial centers  18,454  15,934 
Other financial centers 1/  70,213  59,856 
World 214,458  202,103 
    
Share SIFC  8.6%  7.9% 
Share other financial centers  32.7%  29.6% 
 
1/  Include Belgium, Cyprus, Hong Kong S.A.R., Iceland, Ireland, Liberia, Malta, Netherlands, Singapore, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, External Wealth of Nations database.    25  
 













Total Assets and Liabilities GDP Population
 
 
Note:   Share of SIFC group in global cross-border investment positions; global GDP; and global population.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations, IMF; United Nations; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and national 
sources. 
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Note: the columns depict the sum of external assets and liabilities, in billions of US dollars. Source: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, External Wealth of Nations database.    27  
 










Note: the figure depicts the share of SIFC external assets and liabilities accounted for by individual countries. 
The “other” category includes Bahrain, Netherlands Antilles, Mauritius, Panama, Isle of Man, Lebanon, Macao, 
Barbados, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Gibraltar, Aruba, Andorra, Belize, Samoa, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, Anguilla, Turks and Caicos, Grenada, Vanuatu, St. Kitts, Palau, Montserrat, 
and Nauru.    28  
 















Sources: authors’ calculations and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, External Wealth of Nations Database.    29  
 









Portfolio FDI Other investment Reserves Derivatives
 
Note: The “other investment” category contains primarily bank assets and liabilities. Source: authors’ 
calculations.    30  
 
Figure 6. Hong Kong S.A.R. of China: FDI assets and liabilities, 2007 (billions US$) 
Hong Kong FDI 
abroad














Source: Hong Kong Statistics.  
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Note:  Share of total portfolio assets vis-à-vis SIFCs reported by countries participating in the IMF’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.  
 










Dec.1995 Jun.1997 Dec.1998 Jun.2000 Dec.2001 Jun.2003 Dec.2004 Jun.2006 Dec.2007 Jun. 2009
Liabilities to BIS-reporting banks
Claims on BIS-reporting banks
 
 
Note: the figures reports total claims on and liabilities vis-à-vis BIS-reporting banks, calculated from BIS 
locational banking statistics on an immediate borrower basis (Table 6). There is a break in the series in 
December 2001, when data for the U.K. Channel Islands (Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey) starts to be 
reported separately from U.K. data.  Source: BIS, locational banking statistics.     32  
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Source: Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa (2010). Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland